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When the Supreme Court overturned Roe vs. Wade in 2022 Dobbs The judges who dissented from the ruling warned of an “interjurisdictional war on abortion.” Travel, telemedicine, and other cross-state interactions can raise complex legal questions about which state’s laws apply.
Last week, a New York state trial court ruled against Texas in a dispute over whether New York should recognize a Texas legal judgment against a New York abortion provider.
Back in 2023, New York passed an abortion protection law. The law, designed to protect both patients and providers, places broad limits on the ability of New York state and local governments to cooperate when other states seek to impose civil or criminal liability for abortion care received or provided in New York.
Specifically, this includes telehealth services, such as when a New York provider mails abortion pills to patients in states where abortion is prohibited. Currently, nearly half of all states have some form of shield law in place, and eight states, including New York, have explicit telehealth protections. These shield laws have led to widespread use of telemedicine abortion services by patients in states where abortion is prohibited.
Enter Texas. In 2024, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed a civil lawsuit against New York doctor Margaret Carpenter for shipping abortion pills to patients in Texas in violation of Texas law. Carpenter did not respond to the lawsuit, and a Texas judge entered a default judgment against her, ordered her to pay a $100,000 fine and other costs and interest, and ordered her to be prohibited from providing abortion telehealth services to Texans.
But the big question was whether Texas could enforce the New York judgment and recover Mr. Carpenter’s assets.
As a general matter, under New York State, a person seeking to enforce an out-of-state judgment must first go through legal proceedings in a New York court to “domesticate” the judgment. Texas sought to begin the process by filing documents with New York County Clerk Taylor Brooke. However, Mr. Brooke pointed to New York State’s shield law and refused to proceed with the application.
Texas then filed a state lawsuit against the clerk seeking an order (or writ of mandamus, for you legal buffs) requiring Mr. Brooke to accept Texas’ filings. To the extent New York’s shield law prohibits clerks from doing so, Texas argued that the law violated the U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith and Trust Clause. Texas lawyers argued that “the Texas court’s decision cannot claim that New York’s public policy is an exception to plenary faith and credit.”
last week, texas vs brookNew York Judge David Gandin dismissed the Texas lawsuit. The court reasoned that Mr. Carpenter’s conduct fell squarely within the scope of the Shield Act. And Mr. Brooke was legally barred from proceeding with the Texas application because the law prohibits state and local officials from using “time, resources, equipment, or personnel” to facilitate proceedings that would impose liability on Mr. Carpenter.
But the potential big legal challenge was Texas’ constitutional claims, which the court struck down on procedural grounds. Although Texas raised the Full Faith and Credit Clause at the press conference, its petition to the court did not address constitutional challenges to New York’s shield law. The court therefore ruled that constitutional issues were “not at issue” in the proceeding.
Even if the court’s procedural rulings could prevent New York courts from taking up Texas’ constitutional arguments; Bruckbut Texas’ full faith and credit claim looms over future litigation.
In an 1892 incident called Huntington vs. Attrilethe Supreme Court laid out a complete faith-and-fiduciary duty framework for states, explaining that states need not recognize essentially “penal” judgments from other states. Although this clearly applies to criminal penalties, the court also indicated that civil laws aimed at punishment are also covered.
However, as UCLA law professor Lindsey Wiley explains: state court reportexisting precedent on what constitutes a criminal purpose is scant. Wiley argues that the relevant question should be whether a civil judgment “punishes an individual in the name of protecting public morality and the health and lives of future pregnant patients.” If the court adopts Wiley’s formula, cases like Carpenter’s would likely fall outside the state’s full trust and confidence obligation.
After all, this is an issue that is almost certain to end up before the Supreme Court. The cross-jurisdictional war on abortion has only just begun.
Alicia Bannon is the editor-in-chief state court report. She is also the director of justice programs at the Brennan Center for Justice.
