Last month, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a state law that prohibits people under the age of 21 from carrying handguns in public. The court refused to comply with the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision that interprets the federal second amendment, and instead said the relevant investigation was in the original official meaning of the Georgia Constitution. And because the language was read out over time, the court said it was likely to include judicial interpretations before and after the latest adoption in 1983.
The second amendment was adopted and not amended in 1791, but the constitutional protections of many states of the right to maintain and endure weapons have been subject to multiple amendments and rehears over time. And the state is still tinkering around. Iowa recently added gun protection to its state constitution. Other states, for example, have amended regulations to require strict scrutiny of issues with gun laws.
How will the complex history of state constitutional protection affect the courts seeking to clarify the original meaning? In Georgia, Stephensv. Statethe state high court avoided this issue by ultimately discovering that plaintiffs were not shown to encourage courts to reconsider precedents interpreting Georgia’s constitutional provisions. But even if they did, the court said that when the language was loaded by subsequent constitutional treaties, it appears that a judicial decision to interpret an earlier version of the protection of the state’s constitutional arm rights was “burned in.”
Stevens Thomas Stevens, 20, was involved. He sued Georgia and challenged state laws that prohibit people under the age of 21 from doing so, with limited exceptions. He challenged the state’s age restrictions under the Georgia Constitution alone, not the second federal amendment.
Stevens urged “review and dismiss (that) precedent” to interpret Georgia’s constitutional provisions, and “replaced with legal tests developed in federal courts to assess federal constitutional rights.” In other words, Stephens said,bridgeThe Georgia analogue is the second amendment, and the state courts have the Georgia constitution interpreted and ask whether the challenged public restrictions are consistent with history, tradition and regulatory practices.
The Georgia Supreme Court has rejected this path. Rather than applying the tests developed by federal courts for the US Constitution, the judge explained that the relevant investigations are in the original official meaning of Georgia provisions, but added that “to show the original meaning of the constitutional text that first appeared in one of our constitutions in the 1860s is that it has since been reloaded into new ones, as of constitutional construction.”
Georgia’s national protection rights remained until 1865. Like several other states, Georgia’s regulations explicitly point to the power of Congress to regulate the carrying of weapons. The language was added in 1868 by amendment. The decision was made in 1874, Hillv. Statethe Georgia Supreme Court interpreted this provision in its challenge to the state’s hidden carry ban. hill It found that language that allows Congress to regulate weapons’ “attitudes” encompass hidden carry bans. According to hill The Court states, “The preservation of public peace and protection of the people against violence are Congress’ constitutional obligations, and the assurance of the right to maintain and endure arms should be understood and interpreted in harmony with these constitutional obligations.”
The later Georgia decision also recognized that the “Etiquette” clause referred to broad police powers to regulate arms transport. As Stevens The court stated that, as the Georgia Supreme Court issued an unusual decision in 1846, “There are even deeper roots to this understanding of our state’s constitutional right to possess weapons.” Nunnv. State – Before weapon protection is added state Constitution – interprets the second amendment of the Commonwealth and discovers that Congress retains the power to regulate how arms are borne. A long-standing judicial view was that the Georgia Constitution holds a wide range of regulatory power for carrying public firearms.
Stevens The court later explained that even if an early decision, which found vast police powers to regulate arm carrying, misinterpreted the original intent of the Georgia Constitutional Clauses, “there is a good argument that construction is part of the settlement of the meaning of that language, as exists in the current constitution of 1983.” In other words, Georgia maintained the same arm rights as it drafted and ratified an updated state constitution that was overwhelmingly approved by voters in 1983, and the rehears supported previous judicial decisions that implicitly interpreted the clauses. or Stevens The court states, “If that previous construction is considered ‘consistent and decisive,’ it is presumed that previous construction in that language has been adopted along with the reading language. ”
If voters wanted to reject these decisions, they would likely have changed their language by restricting or attacking references to legislative powers to regulate them. Therefore, the construction of previous judicial justice is likely a critical part of the constitution itself: “”Hill. . .It interpreted the etiquette clauses of current Paragraph VIII that first appeared in the 1868 Constitution and has since been loaded in five more Georgia Constitutions.
Stevens The court strongly implied that it was prevented from revisiting the state’s previous interpretations in any way. This is an interpretation that provides the Congress with strong authority to restrict weapons. However, “Stevensuch (d) held that the original official meaning of paragraph VIII does not provide a compelling argument that it is meaningful to our court’s consistent precedents addressing the language of its prescribed for over a century,” the court stated that it was a burden on Stevens to present evidence suggesting that the established interpretation was incorrect. He did not, and his challenge was denied.
Many states, including right-wing states such as Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas, have state constitutional language that explicitly refers to the Congress’s ongoing ability to regulate firearms in a specific way, often by limiting the way in which guns were transported. Stevens It may then fuel its efforts to amend provisions to remove languages relating to permitted restrictions, as Louisiana did in 2012. Oklahoma lawmakers proposed a similar revision last year, but ultimately failed in the state Senate. Such changes are less consequential, as almost all gun law challenges evoke state provisions associated with the federal second amendment, but are low fruit for the red state gun correct advocates. These amendments are interesting examples of state legislators voluntarily voluntarily renounce the powers specifically recognized in the state constitution.
Under the approach of Stevensstate constitutional provisions, including regulatory capabilities, could also diverge significantly from the amendment to Article 2 of the Commonwealth. Ultimately, the broad state court interpretation of the power to regulate may encompass the age, sensitive location, and licensing laws that federal courts may ultimately decide. And the construction of state courts of constitutional rights varies from state to state, of course. Some states have a stricter tradition of gun control than others, and federal courts may decide that the “nation” tradition is a more generous regulation tradition, or that the stricter state is a historic “outlier.”
The Supreme Court struggled with the Second Amendment Jurisprudence to homogenize state and federal constitutional rights when it comes to arms maintenance and bearings. For example, in District of Columbia vs Heller The majority declared that “the right to have similar weapons in the state constitution, which followed the adoption of the second amendment,” was a relevant guide to interpretation of the second amendment. and Heller explained Nun – The earliest Georgia incident cited Stevens As originally provided a robust right to regulate – “How the surgical clause of the second amendment fully captured the way in which the purpose announced in the preface clause, continuity with English rights.” In other words, the court is framed Nun Consistent with the view of personal rights in the second amendment, as demonstrates that the absolute ban on maintaining or transporting guns is historically abnormal – support No hidden carry.
still Stevens It shows the shock of the coast. The more federal courts have a vast view of the second amendment related to public carry, including banning sensitive locations and removing age restrictions, the less reasonable it makes sense to deal with state constitutional protections that incorporate the broader powers to regulate the carrying of guns that constitute the same right. That’s because, like Georgia, some state courts interpreted these protections as consistent with the robust restrictions on guns in public spaces. therefore, Stevens is a sign of a more fundamental question of the Supreme Court’s originalist approach. This is built on the foundations of state constitutions, which are likely not to support the widest range of applications.
Andrew Willinger is the executive director Duke Firearms Law Center Lecture Fellow at Dew Kra School.
Suggested Citation: Andrew Willinger, Georgia Supreme Court allows a ban on carrying handguns under the age of 21.sᴛᴛᴇcᴏᴜʀᴛrᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ (June 16, 2025), https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/georgia-supreme-courts-under-21 handgun-carry-ban
