Kiev, Ukraine
–
Trump Putin’s meeting has been floating around by both sides for a while. So why would one side want that to happen now?
President Donald Trump wants to endure the power of his character to build the deal, believing that six months of incompromise from Moscow could be overcome by meeting face to face with the Kremlin’s head. He appears to be still stubborn to the idea that the Kremlin can be covered to stop the war, despite Russian counterparts suggesting the biggest position that Russians and Ukrainians are alone and Russian soldiers are Russia.
Russian leader Vladimir Putin has already rejected an unconditional ceasefire proposal in May in Europe, the US and Ukraine, hoping that instead it will offer two unilateral, short, insignificant moratoriums. His troops are moving forward on the frontlines in summer attacks, and may be close enough to his goal of fall negotiations going beyond a very different status quo in war.
If two men meet, one obvious American purpose is a trilateral summit with Ukrainian President Voldy Mie Zelensky to discuss the end of the war. Russia’s purpose is likely to allow Putin to bring Trump back to the orbit of the Moscow story.
Still, the summit – previously floated and previously delayed – could happen this time, and it raises the question of how the war will end. Here are five possible scenarios:
Very unlikely. It’s unlikely that Putin would agree to a ceasefire where the frontline remains. The US, Europe and Ukraine have already requested such a moratorium in May under the threat of sanctions, and Russia has refused. Trump has stepped away from sanctions and preferred low-level consultations in Istanbul, and has not gone anywhere. The 30-day ceasefire on energy infrastructure earlier this year was limited compliance or success.
The Kremlin is now turning frontline increments into strategic advantages, and as they reach that height, there’s no point in stopping this progress. Even the threat of secondary sanctions against China and India, which appear to resist US pressure, will not change its immediate military calculations for the rest of the summer. Putin will want to fight as he is winning at least until October.
2. Pragmatism and other lectures
The lecture could agree to seal off Russian interests as winter begins and cooperate with more consultations when the fronts are frozen militarily and literally around October. By then, Putin may have taken the towns east of Pokrovsk, Kostiantinibka and Kupiansk, giving him a solid position to sit and reorganize in the winter. Russia can then fight again in 2026 or use diplomacy to make these interests permanent. Putin may also raise the illusion of elections in Ukraine – delayed due to war, and temporarily pointing Trump’s story – questioned Zelensky’s legitimacy and even switched him for a more pro-ros candidate.
In this scenario, US and European military aid to Ukraine will help minimize frontline concessions in the coming months, and Putin is asking for the story as he has failed to save once again. Pokrovsk could collapse, threatening other eastern Ukrainian bases, but Ukraine could slow Russia’s advance as before, and the Kremlin could even feel a sanctions and an economy of overheating.
As part of its security assurance, European powers have already formulated advanced plans for the “security forces” to be deployed in Ukraine. These tens of thousands of European NATO forces sat around Kiev and other major cities, providing support for logistics and intelligence in rebuilding Ukraine, creating enough deterrence to allow Moscow to decide to leave the frontline as it is. This is the best Ukraine that Ukraine can expect.
And what if Putin doesn’t stop and diplomacy fails? The following options are not that pretty:
4. Ukraine and NATO catastrophe
Putin has been able to correctly see the rifts of unity in the western world after a summit with Trump, which remains to protect itself, while Ukraine has been able to properly see the rifts of unity in the West. Europe was able to make every effort to back up Kiev, but it was unable to tilt the balance without American backup. Putin was able to see small profits in eastern Ukraine, turning into a slow defeat for Ukrainian forces in the open terrain in flats between Donbas and Dnipro, Zaporisia and the capital’s central city. Ukraine’s defenses could turn out to be weak, and the crisis of Kiev’s military talent turns into a political disaster when Zelensky demands wider mobilization to support the country’s defense.
Kiev’s safety is once again at risk. Putin’s army advances. European powers appreciate that it would be better to fight later Ukrainian Russia within actual European Union territory. However, European leaders lack the political mandate to ultimately take part in the war for lands within Ukraine. Putin moves forward. NATO cannot provide a unified response. This is a European nightmare, but already the end of sovereign Ukraine.
Russia consumed thousands of soldiers in a week for relatively small profits, allowing sanctions to see the alliance with China and revenue from India. Moscow’s sovereign wealth fund financial reserve could decline, and its revenues would fall. Opposition among Moscow elites could be that the Kremlin dismisses an off-diplomatic ramp in the war of choice, supporting military stubbornness and unsustainable proxy conflicts with NATO. Trump becomes a lame duck and the US will focus after mid-term elections return to traditional foreign policy norms in Moscow and its supporters Beijing.
In this scenario, the Kremlin was able to meet at a moment when the resistance to the mundane inconveniences of reality and the economic difficulties of its own people became toxic. Similar poor political calculations maintained the ultimate fruitless occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets in another selected war. Similar moments of debilitating the Kremlin have already emerged in the Ukrainian War. It appears that Putin’s best friend, Yevgeny Prigodzin, has stumbled to lead a short-lived rebellion in the capital.
Putin may be exposed as strong on the surface until he appears frail, then he may be exposed as very weak. It happened to both expansionist Soviet Russia and Putin. The problem with this scenario is that both entertaining the full entry into NATO wars to support Ukraine’s victory, and Kiev’s ability to militarily push Moscow back remain the best hopes of Western strategists.
There is no good option for Ukraine. Only one of them writes about Russia’s actual defeat as a military force and threat to European security. and None of them can gush out of Trump’s encounter with Putin.
